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Risk ranking and analysis in PPP water supply infrastructure 
projects: an international survey of industry experts 
Abstract  
Purpose: Public-private partnership (PPP) for water supply infrastructure services has seen 
continued growth over the past two decades, following public sector’s budgetary constraints 
and inability to provide infrastructure-based water services efficiently and cost effectively. 
However, these projects are often subjected to major risks leading to failures. For this reason, 
this paper aims to identify and evaluate the most significant risk factors that strongly affect 
the implementation of PPP water supply projects.  
Design/methodology/approach: Following extensive literature review and case study 
analyses, an international questionnaire survey was conducted with practising and 
experienced PPP experts to establish the significant risks in PPP water projects. Both the 
probability of occurrence and severity of 40 risks were evaluated by the expert panel in order 
to determine their significance and impact on water projects procured under PPP arrangement. 
Findings: The paper presents a derived risk factor list, ranks the factors, and describes the 
‘top-ranked’ risk factors as: poor contract design; water pricing and tariff review uncertainty; 
political interference; public resistance to PPP; construction time & cost overrun; 
non-payment of bills; lack of PPP experience; financing  risk; faulty demand forecasting; 
high operational costs; and conflict between partners.  
Originality/value: This factor list broadens PPP stakeholders’ view of important project risks, 
rather than relying on culture-dependent studies—an area that has received less attention in
PPP risk management research. The identified risk factors would provide governments and 
investors a useful tool in implementing constructive water PPPs by facilitating the 
development of risk mitigation strategies, particularly for developing countries with poor risk 
management practices. 
Keywords: Public-private partnerships, water supply projects, risk identification, risk 
assessment  
1. Introduction
Since 1990s, the global water industry has seen a marked growth in public-private partnership 
(PPP) water supply projects, in response to the need to invest in public water infrastructure 
and the constraints on public financial resources, growing water demand (Nickson, 1996; 
Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998) and the numerous PPP benefits. Such advantages include 
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value-for-money (VfM) through optimal risk allocation, managerial and technical expertise 
and innovation, reduced life-cycle cost, and improved service levels, efficiency and 
performance (Marques and Berg, 2011; Zheng and Tiong, 2010). PPP assumes many forms, 
such as private-finance initiative (PFI), water concessions, joint-ventures, etc (Henjewele et 
al., 2014). PFI – the popular model in the UK – is seen as the forerunner (Smyth and Edkins, 
2007) and involves utilising private sector’s financial resources, innovative and management 
skills, and capabilities in providing public infrastructure and services (Oyedele, 2013). HM 
Treasury (2012) noted that more than 700 projects have reached their financial close with 
private sector investment of around £55 billion. Despite its perceived advantages, such as 
substantial risk transfer, disciplined method of procurement, cost effectiveness and long-term 
thinking (Dixon et al., 2005), PFI has major flaws that include high transaction cost, 
inflexibility, lengthy procurement period, inexperienced public sector, waste, and lack of 
transparency (Carrillo et al., 2008; Dixon et al., 2005; HM Treasury, 2012). Following these 
shortcomings, the U.K. Government’s new approach, Private Finance 2 (PF2), has been 
introduced for attracting private finance in public infrastructure and services delivery (HM 
Treasury, 2012). Briefly, PF2 primarily seeks to offer access to broader sources of debt and 
equity finance, increase transparency of liabilities of projects and equity returns of investors, 
offer increased flexibility in delivery of services, and expedite and minimise costs of the 
procurement process (HM Treasury, 2012). Thus PF2 will draw on private sector expertise 
and finance to provide public infrastructure and services while tackling the weaknesses of its 
predecessor, PFI.   
 
PPP in the water sector “involves transferring some or all of the ‘assets’ [and]/or ‘operations’ 
of public water systems into private hands” (Palaniappan et al., 2006, pg. 10). This definition 
implies the basic characteristics of PPP, including ultimate public sector ownership and 
responsibility of (water) assets, risk allocation and responsibilities between public and private 
sectors, contribution of resources (financial, technology and human), and existence of a 
‘partnership’ (HM Treasury, 1997). A partnership style approach to infrastructure and services 
delivery is seen as a key element in PPP (World Bank, 2003), prompting National Audit Office 
(NAO, 2001) to suggest that tightly specified contracts should have some flexibility in order to 
sustain contractual relationships in a spirit of partnership. This requires that public-private 
parties share a common vision of how best to work together in a project (NAO, 2001).   
 
Well-structured PPP water supply projects have good market returns and continue to attract 
the private sector’s interest at a time when governments are constrained in their willingness to 
add to the already high public debt (Chung et al., 2010). In response to this challenge, and 
following the Dublin International Conference on Water and Environment and the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (held in 1992), many governments have 
adopted PPPs as a financial means to procure water infrastructure and services.  
 
Moreover, with considerable acceptance of the PPP policy following its backing by The World 
Bank and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) since 1993 and 
1994, respectively (Chong et al., 2006), different models have been utilised in developing and 
developed economies regarding the extent of private and public sector participation in water 
services. Figure 1, based on The World Bank’s database, shows that between 1990 and 2011, 
the level of investment exceeded 65,215 (US$ million) in 782 water projects in 62 low- and 
middle-income countries. The figure shows progress in terms of the number of projects and 
investments over the last two decades. The sector attracted much private capital in the 1990s, 
but investments began to shrink after 2000 following huge investment losses. See Ameyaw 
(2012) for a detailed discussion on water PPP trend.  
 
[Please, insert Fig. 1 around here] 
 
Despite its advantages, PPP involves risks and uncertainties in planning, implementation, and 
monitoring (Wibowo and Mohamed, 2010; Ameyaw, 2012) that vary according to 
country-specific and project circumstances (Zheng and Tiong, 2010), and external 
uncertainties occurring in the contractual relationships between the private and public sectors 
due to intrinsic differences in working practices and objectives (Ibrahim et al., 2006). 
Following a lack of relevant experience and expertise in several countries, these uncertainties 
and risks result to fatal problems and even failures in infrastructure-based water services. 
 
Water-related projects are characterised by multiple risks because the sector accumulates risks 
that apply to infrastructure (OECD, 2009), distinguishing it from other infrastructure sectors. 
Ameyaw and Chan (2013) presented in detail these characteristics as summarised below:  
(a) high capital intensity and huge sunk costs;  
(b) multiple and conflicting public policy objectives;  
(c) highly fragmented sector with diverse institutional setups;  
(d) high asset condition uncertainty; and  
(e) numerous sector performance objectives.  
 
These characteristics define the complexity of the water sector. Also, extant literature suggests 
that the difficulties and controversies encountered in water PPPs initiated over the past two 
decades have emerged from poor understanding and underestimation of the risks associated 
with the sector (Orr et al., 2005; OECD, 2009). For example, the socio-political constraints of 
raising previously subsidized public water services to cost reflective levels were largely 
misunderstood and underestimated. Despite these constraints, water PPPs have come to stay. 
They do not only relieve governments of budgetary pressures (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998), 
but also generate productive efficiency gains from market competition (Rivera, 1996).  
 
The conjecture of the current paper is that risk factors underlie the huge investment losses and 
failures in most PPP water supply projects. Hence, if relevant risks and uncertainties are 
understood properly, the betterment of risk allocation and proactive risk management is 
expected to occur in PPP water services delivery (Chung et al., 2010). The authors aim to 
explore the following critical questions: in PPP water supply projects (i) what are the actual 
risk factors encountered, and (ii) which of these risk factors concern the direct project partners 
(private water investors and host-governments) the most? By answering these questions, this 
paper seeks to conduct a more up-to-date assessment of the critical risk factors in PPP water 
projects, by drawing on international PPP experts with direct involvement in these projects. 
Thus the authors explore the domain of objective risk or epistemic approach to risk (Charette, 
1989), which allows industry experts to offer opinion based on their individual experience. It 
is hoped that the findings of this research will contribute to both practice and research in risk 
management for PPP water supply projects, at both country and international levels, by 
providing valuable information on critical risks for water operators who intend to invest in 
infrastructure-based water services. 
 
The above research questions are explored in seven sections. Following on this introduction, 
section two reviews extant literature on PPP risk factors, and the knowledge gap and 
justification for the current study are provided in section three. The research methods adopted 
in this study are elucidated in section four while data analysis and results of the survey are 
presented in section five. Section six discusses the most critical risk areas in PPP water 
projects. Finally, conclusions and future research enquiry are presented in section seven. 
 
2. Literature survey: risk identification and assessment 
The literature on risk and risk assessment in PPP projects is vast, because PPP risk factor 
research has been (and continues to be) of interest to both academics and practitioners (Ke et 
al., 2009). Risks and risk management – risk identification and classification, risk assessment, 
risk allocation, and risk management strategies – are the most active research topics in the 
PPP arena.  
 
Risk identification is a systematic and continuous process of understanding, identifying, and 
classifying potential risks associated with a project (Bajaj et. al., 1997). Risk assessment is the 
evaluation of how identified risk factors can affect the success of a project and its outcomes by 
determining their significance (i.e. probability and consequence). Research into risk 
identification is directed toward enumerating risk factors specific to projects in specific 
infrastructure sectors or countries through review of extant literature, interviews and surveys 
with experts, case studies, expert judgment, brainstorming, and Delphi technique (Ameyaw 
and Chan, 2013). Lubka (2002) investigated the role of risk identification in the total risk 
management process (RMP) and concluded that its significance is linked to the necessity of 
knowing all risks facing a project. Many authors (UNIDO, 1996; Ameyaw and Chan, 2013; 
Xu et al., 2011; Ng and Loosemore, 2007) have proposed comprehensive risk registers and 
taxonomies and assessed the respective impacts of those risks on PPP projects.   
 
Drawing on 13 case studies, Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003) observed that the major 
considerations in selecting a PPP financing strategy are project risks, funding availability and 
project conditions, with the most significant project risks in a financing strategy been market, 
political and financial risks. UNIDO (1996) suggested a build-operate-transfer (BOT) risk 
register and classified the risks into two categories as project-specific risks and 
general/country risks. Project-related risks include construction and completion risks, 
developmental and operating risks while country risks involve commercial, political, and 
legal risks. 
 
Shen et al. (2006) studied the Hong Kong Disneyland Theme Park to establish the key risks 
affecting project performance. The significant risks were classified into 13 categories: 
industrial action, site acquisition, legal and policy, unexpected underground conditions, 
inexperienced private partner, changes in market conditions, financial, design and 
construction, operational, land reclamation, force majeure, and pollution to land and 
surroundings.  
 
Ozorhon et al. (2007) presented the risk categories associated with a BOT hydropower plant 
project in Turkey as market, financial, political, legal, construction, and operation risks. 
Thomas et al. (2003) categorised BOT road project risks into four major project phases: 
development phase; construction phase; operation phase; and project life cycle phase, and 
Xenidis and Angelides (2005) also offered practical insights into 27 financial risks in generic 
BOT projects. Lam and Chow (1999) surveyed the impact of financial risks in BOT projects 
on different stages of procurement process and concluded that currency exchange restrictions 
was moderately significant in the operational stage while time overrun was extremely 
significant in the construction phase.  
 
Hardcastle and Boothroyd (2003) and Li et al. (2005) suggested a checklist of risks for private 
PFI/PPP projects in the UK. Li et al. defined 66 risk factors and suggested a 
meta-classification method based on three categories of risks as macro (exogenous), meso 
(endogenous), and micro risks. Grimsey and Lewis (2002) identified nine risks and further 
suggested two broad categories based on the developmental (e.g., design and construction 
risks) and the operational (which includes risks such as revenue, wages, asset operation, 
maintenance and insurance risks) phases of a project. Some researchers have focused on 
evaluation and management of foreign exchange and revenue risks (Wang et al., 2000a, b) 
and political risks (Sachs et al., 2007; Voelker et al., 2008).  
 
Thomas et al. (2006) offered a risk probability and impact assessment framework based on 
Delphi technique and fuzzy-fault tree and established delay in financial close, traffic revenue 
risk, demand risk and delay in land acquisition as the critical risks on BOT tollroads. Ke et al. 
(2011) conducted a two-round Delphi survey with practitioners to assess the key risks in 
Chinese PPP projects. The established ‘top-ten’ risks according to their mean scores are: 
government’s intervention; poor political decision making; financial risk; government’s 
reliability; market demand change; corruption; subjective evaluation; interest rate change; 
immature juristic system; and inflation. Voelker et al. (2008) identified and assessed political 
risks in Indonesia’s PPP power projects by drawing on the perception of government officials, 
investors, lenders and insurers. The authors observed that political risk perception for 
Indonesian power projects is relatively high following the country’s legal and regulatory risk 
and government breach of contract.  
 
Risk-induced factors are industry-specific and significant risk variables established in other 
industries cannot be generalised to the water sector, given the sector’s unique characteristics 
afore-mentioned. In the context of the water industry, Ameyaw and Chan (2013) observed 
that empirical research into risk identification and assessment for PPP water supply projects is 
scanty, despite the growing private interest in public water infrastructure services. From 
Ameyaw and Chan’s extensive literature survey, water PPP risk factor research is summarised 
here as follows. First, some authors have focused on general risks in the water sector (e.g., 
ADB, 2009), risk criticality and allocation in water PPPs (Cheung and Chan, 2010; Wibowo 
and Mohamed, 2010; Xu et al., 2011; Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998), and barriers to water 
PPPs (Choi et al., 2010). Second, few researchers have explored the risks associated with 
specific PPP modalities for water projects, notably BOTs (Zeng et al., 2007). The reason is 
that the BOT model is widely applied in the water sector and involves a plethora of risks right 
from project identification through transfer. The most commonly cited risks from the 
foregoing literature include uneconomic water tariffs, water pricing uncertainty, financing, tax 
policy change, interest rate volatility, water resources price instability, government breach of 
contract, weak host-country banking capacity, completion, government interference, and 
public resistance. 
 
3. Knowledge gap and justification for current study 
Though prior literature has contributed to the knowledge on PPP water project risk factors, 
the two questions posed in the Introduction have not been adequately addressed. Although 
some risk factor lists exist in published literature (e.g., Ameyaw and Chan, 2013; Cheung and 
Chan, 2011; Xu et al., 2011), there is still a lack of or limited consensus on the key risk 
factors that adversely impact on water PPP success across countries. Some of the water 
sector-specific studies are relatively dated (e.g., Moody and Haarmeyer, 1998) and vary in 
scope and detail to offer an avenue for a systematic risk identification and management. Most 
of the risk lists have been obtained based on limited samples (e.g., Ameyaw and Chan, 2013; 
Choi et al., 2010) and were not based on research methods designed to derive reliable 
rankings (e.g., Xu et al., 2011; Moody and Haarmeyer, 1998; ADB, 2009; Xenidis and 
Angelides, 2005). More importantly, published risk factor lists were limited by geographical 
scope, without cross-cultural perspectives (e.g., Cheung and Chan, 2010; Zeng et al., 2007; 
Wibowo and Mohamed, 2010; Xu et al., 2011). That is, these lists are biased by those 
countries’ experience and maturity in water PPP programmes and risk management 
propensity. Most of these studies were based on China because of its active role in using PPP 
to develop its water infrastructure (Chen and Messner, 2005). This study therefore seeks to 
contribute to lessening the country-specific bias, and to widen readers’ view of risk factors 
and their ranking by surveying practitioners from different socioeconomic and cultural 
settings.  
 
4. Research methodology   
To meet the research objectives a four-stage approach was carried out mainly through 
establishment of risk factors, identification of PPP experts, discussions and international 
survey, and data analysis and reporting (Fig. 2).   
 
[Please, insert Fig. 2 around here] 
 
4.1 Identification of risk factors 
The current study aims to establish an authoritative risk factor list, and to validate which of 
those factors are the most significant in PPP water projects. The initial factor list is qualitative 
and subjective, because it draws on related studies and past project cases that were accessed 
from academic and institutional literatures. This effort forms part of a wider research study 
that aims to establish a risk allocation model for PPP water supply projects (see Ameyaw and 
Chan, 2013). The identified risks were further reviewed by three academics/practitioners with 
experience in PPP procurement, which led to a 40–factor list. 
 
4.2 Composition of the expert panel  
Following that the required information demands sound experience and in-depth knowledge 
about the water industry and risks in PPP projects, a purposive sampling approach was used 
to select the panelists. To ensure variation in expert respondents’ background, an expert panel 
was formed by soliciting participation from practitioners with many years (≥5) from different 
cultural and socioeconomic settings (see Table 2) through mixed approaches: (i) searching 
websites of targeted institutions, (ii) authors of journals and books on the topic, (iii) formal 
requests to selected institutions to nominate their most qualified practitioners, and (iv) 
semi-snowballing approach, by opportunistically asking initially-identified participants to 
suggest qualified experts.  
 
In this study, an expert refers to a person with special knowledge/skills evident by his/her 
leadership in a professional organisation, or a person who has held or is holding a higher office 
in a professional institution, a presenter at important national conferences, or a 
primary/secondary writer of peer-reviewed journals (Cabaniss, 2002) in the PPP discipline. 
This definition together with the following pre-defined criteria guided the identification and 
invitation of the suitable respondents:  
 
 Having extensive working experience from the water industry, with a good knowledge 
of water sector risks;  
 Having recent hands-on experience in PPP water projects; and  
 Having in-depth knowledge of the concepts of PPP risk management (including authors 
of peer-reviewed journals and/or books in the PPP discipline). 
 
A total of 326 potential experts were identified and qualified according to their experience and 
cultural background, and emailed enquiring whether they were available and willing to 
complete an email-based questionnaire survey for this research. The invitation email 
explained the purpose, requirements and scope of the research. Subsequently, 35 experts 
expressed willingness and availability to participate the survey. This sample size is explained 
by the following reasons: (1) majority of the e-mail addresses were outdated and therefore the 
invitation e-mails were not delivered; (2) some of the respondents declined following their 
commitments to other duties, and lack of and/or limited experience in water PPPs. This was a 
panel of “certified” PPP experts who reflect current knowledge and diverse viewpoints, but not 
partial to the outcome of the study (Jairath and Weinstein, 1994). 
 
Furthermore, they were a fair representation from the sectors and institutions with interests and 
involvement in PPP water projects, and from different categories and levels of expertise and 
knowledge. These institutions are a mix of public, private, international and academic 
organisations from which diverse experts were selected.  
 
4.3 Questionnaire survey  
Questionnaire survey is widely used in risk management research (e.g., Choi et al., 2010; 
Cheung and Chan, 2011; Wibowo and Mohamed, 2010), because questionnaire is an effective 
tool to measure practitioners’ opinions and is capable of gathering data that reveals 
relationships among their opinions (Spector, 1994). Following the knowledge derived from 
the literature review, case study analyses and expert review of the identified risks, the 
questionnaire was designed and further amended based on the suggestions of four academics. 
To assess the significance of the established risk factors, an email-based ranking-type 
questionnaire survey containing 40 risk variables was conducted between 28 January and 03 
March 2013. Email is a “push” technology that permits a researcher to directly communicate 
with target respondents (Andrew et al., 2003), irrespective of geographical location. 
 
The assessment of the significance of PPP risks is a complex issue shrouded in imprecision, 
such imprecise terms are not avoidable because risk managers find it simpler estimating the 
probability and severity of risk factors in qualitative linguistic terms (Wang et al., 2004). For 
purposes of reliability and preciseness (Wang et al., 2004) of the email-based questionnaire 
survey, the experts were asked to rate both the probability of occurrence and severity of each 
risk according to a seven-degree rating system (1=extremely low and 7=extremely high). This 
scale renders the data suitable for different statistical analyses. Each risk was defined at the 
beginning of the questionnaire to ensure that experts’ ratings are based on a common 
understanding of the risk variables. 
 
Valid responses of 32 were received, which represented a response rate of 91.4%. Despite the 
small sample size, the findings are still significant because the panelists occupy senior 
positions in their respective organisations and have hands-on experience in PPP water 
projects (as shown in Table 1), and are from 15 countries (Table 2). These were experts who 
were willing and able to make meaningful contribution to knowledge and information.  
 
Furthermore, the experts have different categories and levels of expertise and knowledge: 
academic and research institutions
1
 (51.5%); international development banks (The World 
                                                     
1
 This category of experts comprised book and peer-review journal authors with industry experience. 
Bank, African Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank) (21.2%); international 
consulting firms and water operators (18.2%); international water non-governmental 
orgainsations (WaterAid-UK) (3.0%); and public sector agencies (6.1%). The experts have 
averages of 17.7 and 11.8 years of industrial and hands-on PPP experience, respectively while 
48.5% hold senior managerial positions (e.g., senior water specialists, lead economists, 
infrastructure advisory leads, etc), 27.3% are professors and 24.2% are Ph.D holders in their 
present institutions. This rich experience of the experts guarantees the reliability of their 
feedbacks for the study. 
 
Comparatively, this sample size is bigger than those used in previous related studies, 
including: 27 (Sachs et al., 2007), 19 (Choi et al., 2010), 31 (Wang et al., 2004), and 17 
(Voelker et al., 2008) respondents. Finally, all the experts demonstrated immense interests in 
our research and most have requested for the final research report. The experts’ background 
information is given in tables 1 and 2.  
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
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5. Data analysis and results 
The feedback collected from the questionnaire survey was analyzed using various statistical 
methods by the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 21.0. Prior to conducting the 
statistical analyses, the internal consistency and reliability of the factors was assessed through 
the Cronbach’s alpha model (Cronbach, 1951) to ensure validity. The alpha-value ranges 
between 0 and 1. Values of Cronbach’s alpha for risk probability and risk severity are 0.942 
and 0.954, respectively, which are above the recommended threshold of 0.70 (Hair et al., 
2010). This suggests a high degree of uniformity on the survey instrument and a high level of 
consistency regarding correlation amongst the 40 risk factors. 
 
Quantitative feedback to the questionnaire survey were analysed using the mean score (MS) 
ranking analysis (Cheung and Chan, 2011), which were then ranked in order to establish the 
relative significance of the 40 risk factors. The MS was calculated using the following 
formula: 
                                                                                                                                                        
Academics without industry experience are excluded.  
  
 
N
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where, MS = mean score of a risk factor; n = score given by expert respondents based 
on a seven-point scale from 1 to 7; and N = number of expert respondents that rated a 
risk factor (N = 32). The feedback has two groups of data, the probability of occurrence and 
magnitude of severity of each risk. The ranking of probability of occurrence and severity of 
the factors is directly based on the mean scores (as shown in Table 2).  
 
Project risk is a joint function of probability of occurrence and severity and can be 
measured with the following formula: 
 
 y,severityprobabilitfRisk   
For example, Carter et al. (1994) and Ke et al. (2011) termed above method of risk 
measurement as expected value (EV) and risk significance index (RSI), respectively. By this 
method, it is possible to rank all the risk factors based on their RSI scores. A square-root of 
RSI gives a risk impact on a project, as shown in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) was computed to measure the extent of agreement 
among the experts on their rankings for the risk factors. The W-values and the p-values for 
scored probability and severity rankings were 0.163 and 0.000, and 0.174 and 0.000, 
respectively. The low W-values indicate a very weak consensus among the expert panelists 
(Schmidt, 1997). However, because the respective p-values for probability and severity were 
less than 0.05, the findings are (statistically) significant, implying that all the experts’ 
rankings were consistent (Rasli, 2006). It is worthnoting that it is difficult to achieve a high 
value of W (i) where 40 risk factors are assessed against a seven-point rating scale (ii) by 32 
experts from 15 different cultural and socioeconomic environments.  
 
6. Findings and Discussion  
The survey results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. This section discusses the significant 
findings of the international survey based on the collective opinion of the expert panelists.  
 
6.1 Overall ranking of risk factors for PPP water supply projects 
On risk probability and severity (Table 3), the following observations are made; first, the 
mean index for the risk probability ranges from 2.81 to 4.50, which suggests that the 
likelihood of risk occurrence ranges from low to high levels. The mean scores of the risk 
severity ranges from 3.91 to 5.41, indicating that the risk severity ranges from moderate to 
high levels. Ultimately, the risk probability and severity ranges suggest that the variations in 
the experts’ responses are relatively small, 1.69 and 1.50, respectively. Second, 19 out of the 
40 risks have mean probability index ≥ 4.0, and 39 factors have mean severity index ≥ 4.0, 
which suggests that the panelists perceive 98% of the ranked risks within moderate to high 
severity range. The implication is that project managers would be more interested in the 
consequences of risk events. 
 
The impact values of the risks range between 3.61 and 4.84 and the risk factors were divided  
into two impact groups: high impact (mean ≥ 4.50), and moderate impact (mean < 4.50) risk 
factors (Table 4). Overall, nine risk factors belong to the ‘high impact’ group while majority 
(31) of the risk variables have ‘moderate impact’ on PPP water projects.  
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
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Analysis of the rankings and comparison with earlier studies (e.g., Cheung and Chan, 2010; 
Zeng et al., 2007; Choi et al., 2010; Wibowo and Mohamed, 2010) provide some key insights. 
Given the changes in the water industries across countries over the last two decades, it is 
expected that, first, some risk factors have remained relatively significant. These factors 
include water pricing and tariff review uncertainty, political interference, public resistance, 
construction time and cost overruns, nonpayment of bills, etc (Choi et al., 2010), which 
mostly fall in the ‘high impact’ group. Second, most risks have declined in significance, 
perhaps due to sector reforms and better approaches to managing such risks. They largely 
belong to the ‘moderate impact’ group, including traditional political risks (e.g., political 
discontent & early termination, expropriation, political violence & government instability, 
currency convertibility and transferability), policy & legal frameworks, residual value risk, 
fall in demand, foreign exchange rate, procurement risk, etc. Third, because previous lists 
were limited by culture, this list contains some unique, significant factors that are not detected 
in many previous rankings, such as poor contract design, low quality of raw water, water asset 
condition uncertainty, corruption, raw water scarcity, water theft, and climate change risk 
which ranked 1
st
, 13
th
, 15
th
, 15
th
, 21
st
, 26
th
, and 39
th
, respectively. This list extends the 
coverage of some known risk items and further indicates that some important risks have 
emerged in the global water PPP market. For example, climate change risk and its associated 
consequences (raw water scarcity, low quality of raw water) are topical in today’s water 
industry (Zwolsman et al., 2011). Therefore, drawing on country-specific studies may ignore 
and leave readers blind to some important factors. 
 
Overall ranking for the risk factors — between moderate and high impact — suggests that the 
risk list is reliable and covers significant risk factors. Therefore, readers should note that most 
of the factors are situation-dependent; a moderate risk may be critical in a given environment.   
 
6.2 Discussion of critical risks on PPP water supply projects 
As indicated earlier, our approach makes it possible to generalise a ‘top-ten’ risk factors 
across different socioeconomic settings. First, this is due partly to space limitation. Second, 
unsurprisingly, these risk items comprise the nine ‘high impact’ factors with ‘moderate’ to 
‘high’ probability mean indices and ‘high’ severity mean scores, and the tenth risk factor has 
a ‘moderate impact’, close to the ‘high impact’ level (Table 4). Also, given the importance 
assigned to relationship management (Zou et al., 2014) in the literature, ‘conflict between 
partners’ is discussed. These risks are believed to be critical in the water industry because 
they are recurring factors in some literature conducted across cultures and times. Possible 
sources and consequences of these risk factors are summarised in Table 5.  
 
 [Insert Table 5 around here] 
6.2.1 Poor contract design  
Overall, the ranking exercise corroborates that poor contract design is the factor the expert 
respondents perceived was most significant, ranking first. It is a factor that is missing in 
previous factor lists. The mean scores of the probability, severity and impact for this risk are 
4.41, 5.31 and 4.84, respectively, with a significance index of 23.41. Meeting performance 
targets in a partnership is heavily dependent on how well the contract is designed (Cowen and 
Komives, 1998). The contract, which outlines rules and guides future behaviours of contracting 
parties, is a critical factor in ensuring successful implementation of a PPP. Subsequent conflicts 
and failure to meet contractual obligations is largely the outcome of faulty contract design in 
terms of, for example, how well an agreed-upon risk allocation is drafted into the contract, tariff 
setting and adjustment, incentives and contract terms, performance targets and measurement, 
and regulation. Several contractual designs, often with clear weaknesses and irregularities, 
have been applied in the water sector as a market test in diverse and challenging environments 
(Marin, 2009). The failed Cochabamba 40-year water concession in Bolivia (Nickson and 
Vargas, 2002) is a good example.  
 
6.2.2 Water pricing and tariff review uncertainty 
This risk is ranked second (RSI=22.03; impact=4.69), with the probability (4.41) and severity 
(5.00) scores ranking third and fourth, respectively. Adequate pricing of water services 
requires a precise approximation of demand-revenue ratio over a project’s duration. This 
estimate commands future price of service and the development of pricing policy in line with 
local regulatory structures. A poor pricing strategy may result from false application of the 
estimation method of the demand/revenue ratio, strategic misrepresentation, wrong data for the 
estimation of the demand-revenue ratio (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005) and misapplication of 
the tariff formula. Economic pricing and tariff review policy remains a massive challenge for 
most water utilities in developing countries because water pricing has long been (and remains) 
volatile and politically sensitive (Dinar, 2000; Harris et al., 2012). Charging economic tariffs 
is often more about political opposition: most governments determine how much a service 
provider is allowed to charge consumers or hold down justifiable tariff increases for water 
services. This risk undermines service levels, results in revenue losses and increased hidden 
costs, and partly explains the poor profitability and inadequate financing in the water sector.  
 
6.2.3 Political interference 
Given that water has a political effect justifies the political interference (sometimes damaging) 
in areas such as tariff setting and reviews (Dinar, 2000). Political interference risk ranked third 
(RSI = 21.72; impact = 4.66), with the probability (4.34) and severity (5.00) scores ranking 
fifth and fourth, respectively. Political interference refers to the risk of government interfering 
in the activities of regulators and private operators, and violating contract provisions, such as 
opposing tariff adjustments. In China, following inadequate and inconsistent laws governing 
PPP activities, local governments can unilaterally change these laws without consultation with 
the investor or considering the consequences on the private partner (Zhang and Biswas, 2013). 
What is required to ensure successful partnerships is a political commitment/support rather than 
unjustified political interference.  
 
6.2.4 Public resistance to PPP 
Public resistance means a lack of or weak support for a water contract with private 
participation. Public resistance risk ranked fourth (RSI = 21.66; impact = 4.65), with the 
probability (4.50) and severity (4.81) scores ranking first and thirteenth, respectively. Public 
resistance is commonplace as far as PPP in water services is concerned (Hall et al., 2005; Hall 
and Lobina, 2012). Resistance has been vocal and remarkable, and successfully delayed or led 
to the revision of original agreements, reversal and termination of several PPP water projects. 
Public resistance in this sector encompasses vibrant interactions with political parties and 
systems such as legal and electoral apparatuses (Hall et al., 2005). From the water management 
literature, it stands to reason that factors for public opposition are similar across countries, 
notably: price hikes, job cuts, hefty profits of investors, opaque nature of some PPP processes, 
unmet service targets, and failed investment promises. There is continued public discontent 
with and resistance to PPP for water services (Kessides, 2004), even in developed countries, 
notably Italy, Spain and Greece (Hall and Lobina, 2012). The risk must be understood in a host 
country’s context and carefully managed to ensure successful private participation. 
 
6.2.5 Construction time & cost overrun 
Construction time & cost overruns are among the most critical risks in PPPs (Lam and Chow, 
1999; Shen et al., 2006). Unsurprisingly therefore, the construction time & cost overrun risk 
was ranked fifth (RSI = 21.31; impact = 4.62), with the probability (4.34) and consequence 
(4.91) ranking fifth and eighth, respectively. Water infrastructure is complex to design and 
construct. The 
2
Tampa Bay Desalination Plant project which was six years behind schedule 
and over budget shows that timely completion within cost and quality is not guaranteed under 
PPP procurement. Delays, apart from causing a project to exceed its estimated schedule, is 
associated with consequences such as shortage of cash to settle operating costs with ensuing 
debts, delayed maturity period, and increased interest resulting from untimely loans 
settlement (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005). Pribadi and Pangeran (2007) observed that 
construction time overruns for PPP water projects relate to poor coordination of construction 
firms, delays in obtaining planning approvals and land-use rights. 
 
                                                     
2
 A design-build-own-operate-transfer (DBOOT) scheme between Tampa Bay Water and Poseidon 
Resources in the USA 
Conversely, construction cost overruns at the engineering and construction phase requires 
additional substantial finances (ADB, 2000), which constraints profitability of a project 
through high tariffs that result in low demand in the operational phase (e.g., Yuvacik BOT 
water scheme in Turkey). Therefore, the elements of construction cost (costs of cooperation 
and co-ordination, site, imported material/equipment, raw materials, labour, insurance, etc) 
demand effective management to ensure reduced construction costs and high potential for 
profits. 
 
6.2.6 Non-payment of bills 
This risk ranked sixth, with probability, consequence and impact scores of 4.25, 5.00 and 4.61, 
respectively and a significance index of 21.25. Non-payment risk is one of the notable 
challenges in the water industry, particularly in developing countries (Auriol and Blanc, 
2009). Chronic payment failure, which is partly offered as a reason to ‘privatise’ public water 
services, is found to persist even under private management (Ameyaw and Chan, 2013). This 
raises the question of whether the private sector is likely to be any better at managing 
non-payment risk in water PPPs. Unaffordable tariffs, legal/political obstacles to service 
cut-offs, poor service levels, well-rooted habit of non-payment, and poor bill collection 
practices amplify levels of non-payment. In practice, payment risk is mitigated through strict 
collection policies, notably rigorous service cut-offs and (sometimes) court actions. However, 
an enforcement system depends on a host government’s commitment, monitoring and 
legislative powers to penalise defaulting customers. 
 
6.2.7 Lack of PPP experience 
The probability (4.31) and consequence (4.91) of this risk ranked seventh and eighth, 
respectively, and overall, ranked seventh with a ‘high impact’ of 4.60. In countries where PPP 
procurement approach is new, it may be difficult to find local expertise to develop and 
implement PPP projects, without difficulties. Concerns about inexperienced public partners 
and incomplete designs (Cheung and Chan, 2011; Li et al., 2005; Loosemore and McCarthy, 
2008) are sources of tendering difficulties. Advocates suggest that getting started with one or 
two projects is the first step, because experience is gained as more projects are launched. In 
the water sector, countries with interest but limited PPP experience can start with less 
ambitious models, such as service and management contracts at municipal and district levels, 
or engage external advisors in large-scale projects. 
 6.2.8 Financing risk 
The financing risk has probability and severity scores of 4.28 and 4.19, respectively and also 
ranked eighth (RSI = 21.00; impact = 4.58). Availability of adequate funding (debt and/or 
equity) remains an issue for concern in most water projects (Marques and Berg, 2011), 
especially in low-income economies which have been tagged as risky investment destinations 
(MIGA, 2009 in Ameyaw and Chan (2013)). In 2002, the Beijing No. 10 water project which 
was won by a consortium of Mitsubishi Corporation and Anglian Water failed, following the 
consortium’s inability to secure debt financing due mainly to lack of adequate financing 
policies and regulatory structures in China (Zhang and Biswas, 2013).  
 
The capital intensive nature of water supply projects and affordability issues suggest that the 
challenge of financing and refinancing is to secure long-term funding at reasonable interest 
rates that match the lengthy payback periods linked to the huge financial commitments 
needed for building new infrastructure (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998; Xenidis and Angelides, 
2005). Given that the public sector is constrained in providing sufficient funding, the private 
sector is expected to bear this risk. However, an optimal combination of different funding 
sources (public and private) to establish a sound and flexible project financial structure and 
mitigate financing risk is likely to be the most effective approach. 
 
6.2.9 Faulty demand forecasting (over-estimation) 
Errors in forecasted demand mean that future demand is inconsistent with projections. 
Over-estimated water demand forecasts result in revenue shortfalls, renegotiations, and 
variations in original contracts (Lobina, 2005). In water concessions/BOT-type projects, 
demand is predicted over a considerable period, say 25 years. Therefore, an accurate demand 
projection is necessary to ensure viability and profitability of projects, but relies on reliable 
data and appropriate techniques. However, the difficulty of demand forecasting stems from 
the fact that factors influencing future demand (e.g., population growth, weather variations, 
alternative water sources, emergence of small-scale providers) cannot be predicted with 
certainty; good methods can only give average outcomes (World Bank, 2006). It ranked 9
th
 
with a high impact score of 4.52 and the probability (4.22) and severity (4.84) ranked 10
th
 and 
12
th
, respectively. This implies that demand prediction is a major challenge in long-term water 
PPPs (e.g., Chengdu No. 6 BOT water project in China). 
 6.2.10 High operational costs (cost overruns) 
The water sector is unique in that operations are relatively complex and operational costs are 
unstable and difficult to predict. This is because costs of operating water services are linked to 
five functional areas, namely “acquisition [abstraction], treatment, power [energy] and 
pumping, transmission and distribution (including storage), and support services – the overall 
integrative responsibility of utility management” (Clark et al., 1977, p. 6). These functions are 
called the water supply value chain (Ameyaw and Chan, 2013) and the costs rising from each 
functional area are necessary for providing water services, either under public or private 
management.  
 
In PPP procurement, operational cost overruns are attributable to the water operator’s 
responsibility, and external uncontrollable factors (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005). A private 
operator may submit ‘inaccurate’ estimates during the bidding stage as a deliberate attempt to 
win a contract. The winning bidder overstates the financial savings to the host government 
while underestimating the volume of work to operate and maintain the water infrastructure 
services. This tendency activates poor operating cost control which hampers successful 
service delivery and profitability (see the United Water concession in the U.S. (Public Citizen, 
2003)). On the other hand, prevailing economic conditions in the operating environment, 
beyond the operator’s control, may raise operating costs. These pressing conditions include 
foreign exchange rate movement, inflationary pressures and high energy prices. The Maynilad 
Water Services’ experience (Phillippines) shows that external shocks, such as currency risks 
and regional economic crisis (the 1997 Asian economic downturn), could raise operating 
costs by 40% (OECD, 2009). Cost overrun risk is further exacerbated by low water tariffs and 
difficulties in collecting from customers (Harris et al., 2003). In many developing countries, 
governments have kept tariffs below costs and collection rates are low. Attempts at economic 
pricing and/or improving collection rates often result in widespread opposition from 
politicians and consumers (Harris et al., 2012; Nickson and Vargas, 2002; Harris et al., 2003). 
Cost overrun risk results in expensive services, reduced profits, jeopardized creditworthiness 
of project company, and poor services to customers. Consequently, the risk ranked 10
th
 with a 
moderate impact (4.44), high severity of 4.75 and moderate probability score of 4.16, 
suggesting that private operators must concentrate on effective cost control strategies.  
 
6.2.11 Conflict between partners (poor working relationship)  
Given the emphasis placed on conflict between partners in the PPP literature (Oyedele, 2013; 
Smyth and Edkins, 2007; Zou et al., 2014), it is selected for further discussion. The risk ranked 
12
th
, with moderate probability, high consequence and moderate impact scores of 4.03, 4.81 
and 4.40, respectively, and a significance index of 19.40. Often, conflicts engulf water 
partnerships which subsequently affect performance of the public-private participants, waste 
time and resources and jeopardize the project’s success (Trémolet et al, 2004). Conflicts 
primarily emanate from poor working relationship between the public client and the private 
consortium (Oyedele, 2013). Oyedele explained that this occurs when the public client is 
unwilling to endure performance failures in services delivery and work together with the 
private partner regarding performance shortcomings before effecting sanctions (such as 
payment deductions). To ensure a healthy working relationship, NAO (2001) recommended 
that parties should adopt a partnership approach to the project at an early stage, based on 
understanding of each other’s business and a common vision to achieve a mutually successful 
project. This will drive on proactive relationship management (Smyth and Edkins, 2007) and 
its success factors, including commitment of senior executives, clearly-defined project 
objectives, well-designed contracts and effective risk allocation, and integration of the 
different divisions and a multidisciplinary team (Zou et al., 2014). Readers can consult Smyth 
and Edkins (2007) and Zou et al. (2014) for more on relationship management in PPP.    
 
7. Conclusions and future research   
Adequate risk assessment and development of countermeasures for PPP water projects 
necessitates an in-depth understanding of what the actual risk factors are, which of these risk 
factors significantly impact on such projects and require both investors’ and public clients’ 
attention, and how these risk factors differ across cultures. An empirical, email-based 
international questionnaire survey of PPP experts with direct involvement in PPP water 
projects, was conducted to address above risk issues. Because the initial list was based on a 
systematic procedure and the ranking was done by a multicultural panel of 32 of industry 
practitioners, the resulting factor list is authoritative, comprehensive and grounded. Analysis 
was conducted using the risk significance index–a well-established approach in decision 
theory–and the top-ranked risk factors in water PPPs based on their impact values were 
identified as (in order): poor contract design, water pricing and tariff review uncertainty, 
political interference, public resistance to PPP, construction time & cost overrun, non-payment 
of bills, lack of PPP experience, financing and refinancing risk, faulty demand forecasting 
(over-estimation), high operational costs, and conflict between partners (poor working 
relationship). Kendall’s concordance analysis showed that the rankings of the 40 risk factors 
by the experts were consistent. 
 
The ranking of probability of occurrence and severity of risks was directly based on the mean 
score indices. These risk factors relate to two risk categories: host-country risk, and 
project-related risk. A careful observation of Table 4, however, indicates that many risk 
factors in the former category have higher significant indices and impact values than those in 
the latter category. Therefore, risks must be understood in the context of a host country and a 
project’s own right to ensure successful private participation in water services.  
 
The findings from the current study are impactful to risk management in PPP projects with 
implications for both practice and academia, given the limited research studies of this nature. 
First, it provides a comprehensive risk factors that were carefully identified, filtered, and 
assessed by industry experts (actively involved in water PPPs) from 15 cultures of different 
maturity levels of PPP markets. Given its derivation approach, the current list has the 
advantage of been practical and comprehensive compared with previous studies that were 
constrained by cultural perspectives. Second, thus this factor list can assist international water 
investors and host governments to determine what risk factors would impact on water PPP 
projects and aid them in developing risk assessment and mitigation guidelines. Third, the 
study suggests which risk factors, over time, have declined in importance, are relatively stable, 
and have gained prominence in the global water PPP market. Both investors and governments 
should be aware of this dynamism and make conscious efforts to accurately analyse risk 
factors to prioritise risks for management purposes.   
 
As with any empirical questionnaire survey, the following limitations must be noted: the risk 
factors were collected from projects cases reported in the water PPP literature and assessed by 
a limited number of practicing PPP experts. Therefore, for a specific project in a given 
cultural setting project stakeholders may need to add unique risk factor(s) to the above 40 
factors, or certain low-ranked factors in Table 4 may need to be given much attention. 
However, the expert sample is relatively diverse, and the risk factor list has a wide coverage 
of possible risk factors in PPP water projects.  
 
The outcome of the current study has value for PPP in the water industry and researchers. The 
risk factors provide pointers to PPP initiatives across cultures, both mature and emerging PPP 
markets. While sector-specific empirical studies are essential to investigate particular 
countries, the research method and the established risk factor list can be used, and results 
compared to commence a broad knowledge base. Country-specific risk items can be added to 
reveal a wide coverage of critical risk factors for PPP water supply projects.     
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Fig. 1 Trends in water PPPs in developing countries (Source: World Bank database) 
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Table 1 Background of Experts  
Respondent Profiles Categorisation Count Percentage (%) 
Type of sector Public  4 12.5 
Private 7 21.9 
Academic/ research  14 43.8 
Mix (of above) 7 21.9 
 
Number of years of industrial experience  Less than 6 years 3 9.4 
6 – 10 years 4 12.5 
11 – 15 years 5 15.6 
More than 15 years 20 62.5 
 
Number of years of PPP research/ experience Less than 6 years 4 12.5 
6 – 10 years 12 37.5 
11 – 15 years 7 21.9 
More than 15 years 9 28.1 
 
Number of PPP projects participated Less than 3 projects 6 18.8 
3 – 5 projects 10 31.3 
Above 5 projects  16 50.0 
 
Type of PPP projects participated  Lease/affermage  3 9.4 
Concessions/BOT-type  10 31.3 
Management contract 1 3.1 
Mix (of above) 18 56.3 
 
Table 2 Geographical background of experts 
Region  Country  No. of experts 
Africa  7 
 South Africa  3 
 Nigeria 1 
 Tunisia 1 
 Senegal 2 
Asia  11 
 Hong Kong  2 
 China  6 
 Indonesia  1 
 Bangladesh  1 
 Korea 1 
America  7 
 USA 6 
 Portugal 1 
Europe  5 
 Greece  2 
 UK 2 
 France  1 
Australia  2 
Total  32 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Overall ranking of risk factors in PPP water supply projects   
Risk Factor 
Risk Probability Risk Severity  Risk 
Significance 
Index 
Risk 
impact
*
 
Risk 
Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank 
Poor contract design 4.41 3 5.31 3 23.41 4.84 1 
Water pricing and tariff review uncertainty 4.41 3 5.00 4 22.03 4.69  2 
Political interference 4.34 5 5.00 4 21.72 4.66  3 
Public resistance to PPP 4.50 1 4.81 13 21.66 4.65  4 
Construction time & cost overrun 4.34 5 4.91 8 21.31 4.62  5 
Non-payment of bills 4.25 9 5.00 4 21.25 4.61  6 
Lack of PPP experience 4.31 7 4.91 8 21.16 4.60  7 
Financial and refinancing risk 4.28 8 4.91 8 21.00 4.58  8 
Faulty demand forecasting 4.22 10 4.84 12 20.43 4.52  9 
High operational costs  4.16 13 4.75 17 19.74 4.44  10 
Design & construction deficiencies 4.16 13 4.72 18 19.61 4.43  11 
Conflict between partners 4.03 18 4.81 13 19.40 4.40  12 
Low quality of raw water 3.91 22 4.88 11 19.04 4.36  13 
Change in government & political opposition 3.91 22 4.81 13 18.80 4.34  14 
Quasi-commercial risk 4.00 19 4.69 20 18.75 4.33  15 
Corruption 4.47 2 4.19 34 18.71 4.33  15 
Water asset condition uncertainty 4.19 12 4.47 25 18.71 4.33  15 
Land acquisition risk 3.91 22 4.78 16 18.68 4.32  18 
Insufficient private operator performance (operation) 3.97 20 4.66 21 18.48 4.30  19 
Foreign exchange rate 4.09 15 4.44 26 18.17 4.26  20 
Raw water scarcity 3.53 34 5.09 4 17.99 4.24  21 
Pipeline failures during distribution 4.09 15 4.31 29 17.65 4.20  22 
Unfavourable local/ global economy 4.22 10 4.13 37 17.40 4.17  23 
Regulatory risk (weak regulation) 3.91 21 4.38 27 17.09 4.13  24 
Sovereign and contractual risk 3.66 30 4.66 21 17.02 4.13  25 
Water theft 4.06 17 4.16 35 16.88 4.11  26 
Fall in demand  3.56 33 4.72 18 16.81 4.10  27 
Political discontent & early termination 3.72 29 4.50 23 16.73 4.09  28 
Interest rate 3.66 31 4.50 23 16.45 4.06  29 
Inflation rate volatility 3.78 27 4.31 29 16.31 4.04  30 
Procurement risk 3.78 28 4.31 29 16.31 4.04  31 
Supporting utilities risk 3.91 22 4.16 35 16.24 4.03  32 
Absence of policy & legal frameworks 3.81 26 4.22 32 16.08 4.01  33 
Force majeure 2.97 39 5.41 1 16.05 4.01  34 
Expropriation/nationaslisation  2.81 40 5.41 1 15.21 3.90  35 
Residual value risk 3.66 31 3.91 40 14.28 3.78  36 
Political violence/ Government instability 3.19 37 4.34 28 13.85 3.72  37 
Technology risk 3.28 35 4.06 39 13.33 3.65  38 
Climate change risk 3.25 36 4.06 38 13.20 3.63  39 
Currency convertibility/ transferability 3.09 38 4.22 32 13.05 3.61  40 
*
Impact = (Risk Significance Index)
 0.5
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Risk classification and ranking of risk impact on PPP water projects   
Risk Factor Category 
Risk 
Impact 
Risk 
Rank 
Criticality 
Poor contract design Project  4.84 1 High 
Water pricing and tariff review uncertainty Country 4.69 2 High 
Political interference Country  4.66 3 High 
Public resistance to PPP Country 4.65 4 High 
Construction time & cost overrun Project 4.62 5 High 
Non-payment of bills Country 4.61 6 High 
Lack of PPP experience Country 4.60 7 High 
Financing and refinancing risk Project 4.58 8 High 
Faulty demand forecasting Project 4.52 9 High 
High operational costs  Project 4.44 10 Moderate 
Design & construction deficiencies Project 4.43 11 Moderate 
Conflict between partners Project 4.40 12 Moderate 
Low quality of raw water Country 4.36 13 Moderate 
Change in government & political opposition Country 4.34 14 Moderate 
Quasi-commercial risk Project 4.33 15 Moderate 
Corruption Country 4.33 15 Moderate 
Water asset condition uncertainty Project 4.33 15 Moderate 
Land acquisition risk Project 4.32 18 Moderate 
Insufficient private operator performance (operation) Project 4.30 19 Moderate 
Foreign exchange rate Country 4.26 20 Moderate 
Raw water scarcity Country 4.24 21 Moderate 
Pipeline failures during distribution Project 4.20 22 Moderate 
Unfavourable local/ global economy Project 4.17 23 Moderate 
Regulatory risk (weak regulation) Country 4.13 24 Moderate 
Sovereign and contractual risk Country 4.13 25 Moderate 
Water theft Project 4.11 26 Moderate 
Fall in demand  Project 4.10 27 Moderate 
Political discontent & early termination Project 4.09 28 Moderate 
Interest rate Country 4.06 29 Moderate 
Inflation rate volatility Country 4.04 30 Moderate 
Procurement risk Project 4.04 31 Moderate 
Supporting utilities risk Project 4.03 32 Moderate 
Absence of policy & legal frameworks Country 4.01 33 Moderate 
Force majeure Project 4.01 34 Moderate 
Expropriation/nationaslisation  Country 3.90 35 Moderate 
Residual value risk Project 3.78 36 Moderate 
Political violence/ Government instability Country 3.72 37 Moderate 
Technology risk Project 3.65 38 Moderate 
Climate change risk Country 3.63 39 Moderate 
Currency convertibility/ transferability Country 3.61 40 Moderate 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement: 
This paper reports on partial findings of an ongoing research project entitled “Risk Allocation Model for 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Water Supply Projects”, fully funded by the International Postgraduate 
Scholarship from The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, from which other papers have been generated with 
different objectives but share common methodology/background. The authors are grateful to the industry experts 
who kindly participated in the questionnaire survey for this research. 
 
 
Table 5 Sources and consequences of top 10 risk factors  
Risk factor  Source(s)  Key consequence(s)  
Poor contract design Lack of public sector expertise in 
PPP contract design; Hurried pace 
of a PPP project 
Ensuing conflict between project partners 
Failure to achieve performance targets 
Opportunistic renegotiations 
Abandonment of project   
 
Water pricing and tariff 
review uncertainty 
Poor pricing strategy 
Government breach of terms of 
contracts, or political opposition  
Undermines private sector confidence 
Threatens profitability of water services 
Suspension of private investment (e.g., Aguas de 
Limeira, Brazil) 
 
Political interference Mainly political expediency Undermines service delivery 
Government-led renegotiation, or termination of projects 
 
Public resistance to PPP Unresolved political and 
institutional issues 
Stalls, or delays private participation in water services 
Abandonment of water PPPs 
 
Construction time & cost 
overrun 
Inefficient construction and cost 
control practices; Lack of 
coordination within construction 
firm and of subcontractors  
Delayed operation and increased interest on loans 
Reduces profits 
High-priced water (e.g., Izmit water BOT, Turkey) 
 
 
Non-payment of bills Customer habit of non-payment; 
Poor bill collection practices 
Disincentive to private sector 
Reduces operator’s revenues 
 
Lack of PPP experience Public institutions’ lack of 
technical expertise and academic 
experience related to PPPs  
 
Projects implementation difficulties 
Gold-plated contracts to private partners  
High costs to taxpayers/ customers  
Financial and refinancing 
risk 
Private sector reluctance to 
investment in risky destinations; 
Global/regional financial crisis 
 
Investment needs remain unmet 
Delayed private investments 
 
Faulty demand forecasting Aggressive bidding, or strategic 
misrepresentation; Unreliable 
data; inappropriate forecasting 
methods 
 
Revenue shortfalls 
Renegotiations of original contracts 
Deferred private investments 
High operational costs  Dive bidding (operator’s 
responsibility); external shocks 
Limits project profitability 
High-priced water services to customers 
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